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LOSS APPORTIONMENT IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT CASES
Courts generally have been reluctant to shift losses arising from
difficulty in performing contractual obligations from the performing party
to the other contracting party. In a recent Court of Claims case, National
Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States,' however, the Government was held
liable for half the losses suffered by the promisor as a result of extended
production difficulty.
In that case the Ordnance Department of the Army entered into
tentative facilities and supply contracts with the plaintiff, National Presto
Industries, for the purpose of establishing a plant for producing shells 2
by an untested method. Ordnance hoped the new method would achieve
concentricity without a grinding step. Plaintiff was to propose equipment it
needed for production, and Ordnance was to pay for items it agreed were
necessary. Ordnance denied plaintiff's proposal for twenty-four plunge
grinders,3 although Ordnance's representative orally promised to pay for
their acquisition if the need became apparent during the course of per-
formance.4 The parties then entered into a final contract for the production
of 180,000 shells to be manufactured by the new process. 5 Over a protracted
period of time plaintiff encountered difficulties trying to mass produce con-
centric shells without shaving off some steel. It then transferred four
lathes from its conventional shell producing plant and attained concentricity
in mass production by removing a small amount of steel-less than had to
be removed under conventional production methods. When delivery was
completed, the Government paid the full contract price as well as the cost
of moving the additional equipment." Plaintiff claimed to have lost more
than 700,000 dollars because of the unforeseen delays and difficulties. The
1338 F.2d 99 (Ct. CL 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
2 The "shell" is the projectile part of the ammunition. See Brief for Defendant,
p. 11, National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, supra note 1.
3 Plunge grinders are "devices mainly used to remove surface imperfections in
steel." 338 F2d at 101. The plaintiff's proposed machinery would have cost $321,000.
4 This oral promise was not disputed. See Brief for Defendant, p. 53, National
Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 962 (1965). However, defendant contested plaintiff's allegation that Ordnance
promised to be responsible for the consequences of doing without plunge grinders.
The court found that plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof on this point. 338
F.2d at 101 n.1.
5Prior to this contract, the parties had entered into an agreement for the pro-
duction of 1,000,000 shells by the new method. Before any shells were produced,
however, the Government terminated the contract along with another for production
of shells at another plant by the conventional method. Then a supplemental agree-
ment was entered into, whereby plaintiff was to produce 1,100,000 shells at either
plant for a fixed price. When 800,000 shells had been shipped from the conventional
plant, the parties entered the 180,000-shell agreement Plaintiff agreed to phase out
operations at the conventional plant. Id. at 102.
6 The Government also authorized plaintiff to purchase automatic lathes, at a
cost of $1,200,000, to remove steel from the shells in future operations. Finding of
Fact No. 48, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 74-75, United States v. National
Presto Indus., Inc., cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
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Court of Claims held that the plaintiff could recover from the Government
half the losses attributable to the delay in furnishing adequate equipment.
The majority held that although the Government's denial of National
Presto's request for plunge grinders did not result in an implied warranty
that production would progress smoothly without turning equipment, relief
for mutual mistake as to the "need for turning equipment . . [and]
the time and work required to establish that need" 8 was appropriate:
To do justice here we need go no further than formulate and apply
a rule for cases of mutual mistake in which the contract, properly
construed, allocates the specific risk to neither party-and the
side from whom relief is sought received a benefit from the extra
work of the type it contemplated obtaining from the contract, and
would have been willing, if it had known the true facts from the
beginning, to bear a substantial part of the additional expenses.9
Judge Whitaker, dissenting, would have denied recovery because
National Presto undertook to do the work for a fixed sum. Although he
conceded that "the result reached by the court in this case would be a fair
and just one, if the contract between the parties permitted it," 10 he thought
that the fixed sum should be the limit of National Presto's recovery.
The court conceived of its result as an "unprecedented" application
of the doctrine of mutual mistake." Like the related doctrine of frustra-
tion,12 mutual mistake is a limitation on the general rule that the promisor
assumes the risk of nonperformance or difficulty of performance.' 3 The
scope of these limitations in the past has been extremely narrow.' 4 The
rule has been that contract reformation should be limited to situations in
which the written instrument failed to conform to the intentions of the
parties-that is, where the actual agreement was imperfectly recorded.'5
7 338 F.2d at 103-06.
8 Id. at 108.
9Id. at 111-12.
10 Id. at 113 (italicized in part in original).
"Id. at 111.
2 Frustration differs from mistake in that the former doctrine excuses perform-
ance when a supervening event, rather than discovery of the nonexistence of a fact
assumed to exist when the agreement was made, destroys the basis of the parties'
bargain. There is no reason for treating the two situations differently. Krell v.
Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 748-49. In each case the circumstances have turned out
not to be as the parties reasonably assumed they would be.
'3 Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 412
(1919) ; Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944) ; HOLMES, THE
Commo" LAWv 300 (1881) ; McTurnan, An Approach to Common Mistake in English
Law, 41 CAN. B. REv. 1-2 (1963).
'4 [I]f a party charge himself with an obligation possible to be performed,
he must abide by it unless performance is rendered impossible by an act of
God, the law, or the other party. Unforeseen difficulties will not excuse
performance. Where parties have made no provision for a dispensation, the
terms of the contract must prevail.
Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, supra note 13, at 412.
15 Day v. United States, 245 U.S. 159 (1917); Maryland Cas. Co. v. United
States, 169 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1948); 3 CoRBiN, CONTRACrs § 614 (2d ed. 1960);
5 WILLISToN, CONTRAcTs §§ 1547-49 (rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§504 (1932).
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Rescission 16 is the traditional remedy where the parties would not have
entered into the contract but for a mutual mistake of underlying fact,' 7 or
where an unforeseen and reasonably unforeseeable event makes impossible
or extremely difficult the performance of one of the parties.18 Of course, in
National Presto rescission was impossible because production had been
completed and the shells delivered.
Although the court placed its decision on mutual mistake, the majority
seems to have had difficulty at times in defining precisely the unforeseen
circumstance that led to judgment for National Presto. For instance, in
finding that the Government benefited from National Presto's protracted
testing, the majority said that the Government wanted to discover by
means of the contract whether, without turning equipment, it could mass
produce shells effectively by the new process. 19 This construction implies
that at the time of the contract at least one party, the Government, was
aware of the danger that turning equipment might be needed. Further-
more, in urging a finding of implied warranty, National Presto argued
that it "foresaw from the beginning that it would still be necessary, even
under the new process, to remove steel from the shells through the use of
turning equipment .... " 20 The court was forced to find that
plaintiff has over-stressed its own knowledge during the pre-
contract stage. The truth, as we see it, is that neither side had
the knowledge plaintiff now attributes to itself; plaintiff wanted
the plunge grinders for insurance but both parties were under the
misapprehension that, given proper engineering, the new process
could be utilized without any turning step.21
Although the court characterized the mistake of the parties as "the need
for turning equipment . . . [and] the time and work required to establish
that need," 22 at one point it conceded that
possibly . . . plaintiff may have bet that turning equipment
would not be needed, but we do not think it bet as to the time and
effort which would be necessary to determine that fact....
[B] oth sides seemed to believe that such a need would be speedily
shown or disproved.3
1 3 "Annulling or abrogation or unmaking of contract and the placing of the
parties to it in status quo." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1472 (4th ed. 1951).
17 Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887) ; Board of Educ. of
Sevier School Dist v. Board of Educ. of Piute School Dist, 85 Utah 276, 39 P.2d
340 (1934); Griffith v. Brymer, [1903] 19 T.L.R. 434 (K.B.); REsrArT=N, CoN-
TRAcTs § 502 (1932). A contract may be rescinded for mutual mistake even though
executed, where the parties may be returned to the status quo. Peace River Phos-
phate Mining Co. v. Thomas A. Green, Inc., 102 Fla. 370, 135 So. 828 (1931) (deed
for land other than that intended to be conveyed).
SThe Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921); The Kron-
prinzessin Cecilie Case, 244 U.S. 12 (1917); Alvino v. Carraccio, 400 Pa. 477, 162
A.2d 358 (1960); Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour,
Ltd., [1943] A.C. 32 (1942); RESTATzuwT, CONTRACTS §§456, 457 (1932).
'9 338 F.2d at 111 n21.
20 Id. at 103.
21 Id. at 108.
22 Ibid.
23 Id. at 109.
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That distinction seems crucial to the finding of mutual mistake. Apparently
the plaintiff had sporadic success in achieving concentricity in mass pro-
duction until lathes were introduced, and only a long period of uncertain
results revealed the need for lathes. Both parties might reasonably have
thought the need would be apparent from the outset of production. As a
foundation for its finding that the parties thought the need for lathes would
be discovered speedily, the court specifically emphasized the novelty of the
process, the relative equality of the parties' expertise, and the large loss
suffered by plaintiff in relation to the contract pricey
4
In addition to discussing mutual mistake, the court justified its result
on another theory. It pointed out that the relationship of the parties gave
rise to something more like a "joint enterprise" than a "performance
contract." 2 The contractor was to "undertake the study and experimenta-
tion, then suggest the procedures to be used, and finally carry out the
experiment." 26 The Government approved or disapproved of the con-
tractor's proposals, and thus participated in the setting up of production
methods2 7 Because of the equality of expertise and the joint establishment
of the production system, the court said that it would have been unrea-
sonable of the Government to expect the contractor to guarantee the pro-
duction system.2 9 The statement by the court that the Government
benefited from the protracted period of testing 2 9 may have been another
way of stating that the Government was keenly interested in the method
used and was partly responsible for its defects, having helped to set it up3°
The court's difficulty in applying the mutual mistake doctrine along
with its use of the "joint enterprise" rationale seems to indicate that its
primary concern was in reaching a fair result. Contrary to the court's
statement,;" however, its flexible approach was not entirely without
precedent. Some legislatures and courts have provided flexible remedies
in mistake and frustration cases where termination of the contractual obliga-
tions may be difficult or undesirable. An example of legislative concern
is a Georgia statute which grants courts the power to reform contracts
for mutual mistake and to rescind on the ground of mistake of one party
only. 2 The power is to be "exercised with caution, and to justify it the
evidence shall be clear, unequivocal, and decisive as to the mistake." 3 An
English statute 34 also gives courts broad powers in cases where contracts
24 Id. at 112 n22.
2 5 Id. at 109.2 6 Ibid.
27 Where the Government alone promulgates specifications which turn out to be
faulty, it is fully responsible for resulting production difficulty. R. M. Hollinshead
Corp. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 681, 111 F. Supp. 285 (1953).
8 338 F.2d at 109.
29 See id. at 110-11 & n.2 1.
30 The court could not have meant that one party benefits whenever the other
party does work it had not contemplated would be necessary. Such a rule would lead
to recovery every time a contractor made less profit than he thought he would make.
31338 F2d at 111.
32 GA. CODE ANN. § 37-207 (1962).
= GA. CODE ANN. § 37-202 (1962).
34 The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40, § 1.
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are rescinded to make adjustments for expenses incurred and benefits re-
ceived by the parties. Courts, too, have developed liberal remedies. In
Patch v. Solar Corp.s5 a clause in an exclusive patent license for the
production of washing machines provided for the termination of the license
if royalties fell below a certain amount. This part of the contract was held
ineffective during the period of a wartime government ban on the produc-
tion of washing machines. In effect the court read an exception into the
termination clause.
Legal writers have advocated the flexible approach which allows courts
to provide remedies other than complete termination of the contract. Under
one plan courts would use the "gap filling" 36 technique, supplementing
contracts with clauses to which the parties would have agreed had they
foreseen the risk of changed circumstances. 37 Professor Corbin is in
accord:
When an actually unforeseen event has caused a promised
performance to be impossible or increased or decreased its cost or
value, and the risks involved can not be shown by a process of
factual "interpretation" to have been allocated by the parties them-
selves, the court must determine their allocation in accordance
with the opinions of men in general, as evidenced by business
practices and social mores. . . A party may reasonably be re-
quired to pay a fair share of expenditures incurred by the other in
the course of his performance, insofar as those expenditures are
now a net loss.3 8
It may occasionally be proper for a court to fashion such a flexible
remedy. This is particularly so in contract actions against the United
States. In such actions, the Court of Claims 39 applies federal law.40 Since,
as a result of the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,41 there is little gov-
erning precedent in federal contract law, the court seems to have the
capacity to fashion new doctrine when necessary to provide just results.
42
35 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945).
36 The term is from Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at
Consolidation, 58 COLUm. L. R-v. 287, 293 (1958).
3 7
1d. at 296, 314; Comment, 59 MicH. L. REV. 98, 118-19 (1960). Smit points
out that the gap filling technique is used in several European countries and may be
coming into vogue in others.
38 Corbin, Frustration of Contract in the United States of Anerica, 29 J. Comp.
LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) pts. III & IV, 1, 8 (1947).
39 The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over contract claims against
the United States when the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, and concurrent
jurisdiction with the district courts when the claim is $10,000 or less. 28 U.S.C.
§§1346, 1491 (1964).
40United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944); Baggett
Tramp. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 864, 868 (Ct Cl. 1963).
41304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42 The court occasionally has been quite liberal in providing relief in suits against
the Government after the contract promises have been executed. E.g., Dillon v. United
States, 140 Ct. Cl. 508, 156 F. Supp. 719 (1957) (severe drought in area of delivery
point; promisor in supply contract for hay held entitled to recover costs of purchasing
hay at insistence of contracting officer from places clearly beyond the area in the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made); Peter Kiewit Sons v.
United States, 109 Ct Cl. 517, 74 F. Supp. 165 (1947) (Government varied contract
[Vo1.114:306
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This is especially appropriate where standard contracts are involved. Al-
though the majority never suggested that such contracts should be treated
any differently from contracts between private parties, at least one con-
sideration indicates that more flexible remedies may be desirable.
This circumstance is the requirement that certain clauses, favorable
to the Government, be included in all Department of Defense contracts.
One mandatory clause under the Armed Forces Procurement Regulations,
the changes clause,43 permits the contracting officer"4 to make changes,
within the "general scope" of the contract, in drawings, designs, or spe-
cifications, method of shipment or packing, and place of delivery. The
clause provides that the contractor may request the contracting officer to
make an equitable adjustment in contract price or delivery schedule,
or both, but that he may not decline to proceed under the amended contract.
If the contractor fails to obtain satisfactory relief from the contracting
officer, he is referred to a second obligatory clause, the disputes clause,
4 5
which gives him a right to appeal determinations initially made by the
contracting officer to the head of the contracting agency or his representa-
tive.4 6 This second intra-agency determination of fact is unassailable
"unless . . . not supported by substantial evidence." 47
A third required clause authorizes the contracting officer to terminate
the contract whenever he "shall determine that such termination is in the
but stayed within broad specifications clause; contractor stated cause of action for
lost profits) ; Harrison Eng'r & Constr. Corp. v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 205, 68
F. Supp. 350 (1946) (release reformed although plaintiff "somewhat negligent");
Virginia Eng'r Co. v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 516 (1944) (contractor recovered
added cost of performance after he "negligently" relied on the Government's "negli-
gent" misrepresentation of the nature of a building site). The results in the Harrison
and Virginia cases seem wrong if the plaintiffs were actually negligent.
13 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-2 (1965). The present regulation is substantially the same
as that in effect when the contract in Nationml Presto was made. See 15 Fed. Reg.
8044 (1950), amending 14 Fed. Reg. 5075 (1949).
44 "The term 'Contracting Officer' means the person executing this contract on
behalf of the Government, and any other officer or civilian employee who is a properly
designated Contracting Officer . . . ." 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-1(b) (1965). The defi-
nition is identical with that in 15 Fed. Reg. 8044 (1950).
45 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1965). The present regulation substantially carries for-
ward 19 Fed. Reg. 5887 (1954) and 17 Fed. Reg. 9856 (1952).
46This representative is the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. 27
Fed. Reg. 3170 (1962) (charter consolidating boards of the separate services). While
the Board was designed to provide an impartial forum, its members are appointed
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) and the assistant
secretaries of the military departments responsible for procurement. Ibid.
47Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964); 32 C.F.R.
§ 7.103-12(a) (1965). The language is the same as 19 Fed. Reg. 5887 (1954) and
17 Fed. Reg. 9856 (1952). The complete clause is: "unless determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial
evidence." 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12(a) (1965). It seems reasonable to assume that the
operative phrase is "substantial evidence."
The current disputes clause provides that "nothing in this contract shall be con-
strued as making final the decision of any administrative official, representative, or
board on a question of law." 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12(b) (1965). Since the distinction
between a question of fact and one of law may become tenuous in a contract case,
the scope of judicial review of an administrative finding may actually be quite broad.
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best interests of the Government." 48 The contractor must submit a ter-
mination claim to the contracting officer.49 The two then negotiate regard-
ing the amounts to be paid to the contractor because of the termination,
"which . . . may include a reasonable allowance for profit on work
done." 50 If they fail to agree, the contracting officer is to reimburse the
contractor for his costs and pay him up to a set percentage of the costs as
profit. 51 Again, the contractor has the right of appeal under the disputes
clause. 2
A fourth clause is required in Department of Defense contracts under
the Renegotiation Act of 1951.5 Although within the confines of con-
scionability there is no limit to the amount of profit a contractor can reap
in a private contract, this is not true of contractors who make agreements
with the Department of Defense. Under the Renegotiation Act, these con-
tractors must agree to renegotiate the contract if the Renegotiation Board
finds that profits have become "excessive." - The act applies when aggre-
gate amounts received or accrued during a fiscal year from contracts with
the specified goverment departments exceed one million dollars.55 If the
Board and the contractor are unable to agree on the amount of excessive
profits, the Board is empowered to determine the amount.56 The act thus
subjects the contractor to the possibility that his "fixed price" will be re-
duced under a vague standard.57 A contractor who wishes to contest the
4s 32 C.F.R. § 8.701(a) (a) (1965) (incorporated by 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-21 (1965)).
The provision in effect during the time of the National Presto case was 17 Fed. Reg.
1808 (1952).
49 32 C.F.R. §8.701 (a) (c) (1965).
560 32 C.F.R. §8.701(a) (d) (1965).
6132 C.F.R. §8.701(a)(e) (1965).
62 32 C.F.R. §8.701(a) (g) (1965).
U365 Stat. 7 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Api. §§ 1211-24 (1964).
465 Stat. 11-12 (1951), 50 U.S.C. AP. § 1214 (1958).
565 Stat 16 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 1215(f) (1) (1964). National
Presto's shell production between June 30, 1954 and September, 1956 led to receipts
of more than $5,000,000. See 338 F.2d at 102-03. It is probable that this production
was not exempt from the Renegotiation Act for lack of a "direct and immediate"
connection with national defense, as provided by 65 Stat. 17-18 (1951), 50 U.S.C.
Apr. § 1216(a) (6) (1964).
5665 Stat. 12 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(a) (1964).
67 See 65 Stat. 9 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1213(e) (1964):
The term "excessive profits" means the portion of the profits derived
from contracts with [the Department of Defense and other specified depart-
ments] ...which is determined in accordance with this title to be excessive.
In determining excessive profits favorable recognition must be given to the
efficiency of the contractor or subcontractor, with particular regard to attain-
ment of quantity and quality production, reduction of costs, and economy in
the use of materials, facilities, and manpower; and in addition, there shall be
taken into consideration the following factors:
(1) Reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular regard
to volume of production, normal earnings, and comparison of war and
peacetime products;
(2) The net worth, with particular regard to the amount and
source of public and private capital employed;




Board's finding may obtain review de novo in the Tax Court,55 but he will
find that the burden of proving error is placed upon him.59
Each clause tends to make the rights and expectations of the contractor
more indefinite and more subject to the discretion of the promisee.6°
Indeed, it is possible that such clauses would render a private party con-
tract void as too indefinite.61 It is arguable that the Renegotiation Act
imposes a one sided bargain on the contractor unless the Government
is made to bear some of his losses if they become "excessive." But even
if the existence of the mandatory clauses does not require special treat-
ment of government contract disputes in a particular case, it at least lends
added support to the Court of Claims' provision of flexible remedies.
It does not necessarily follow that in every case involving mandatory
clauses, the losses should be shared. Courts generally should hesitate to
reapportion losses in executed contracts.62 Where there is evidence that
the parties intended to place the risk of unforeseen developments upon one
or the other, or where the contractor's losses are not of overwhelming pro-
portions, it would seem wise to let the loss remain where it fell. The
promisee's execution of his promise is itself evidence that both parties ex-
pected him to take the risk of loss from performance. The National Presto
case is unusual, however, in that the plaintiff was attempting to perfect an
untried process, and the difficulty in determining the necessity for addi-
tional equipment was not reasonably foreseeable. At no one stage in the
course of perfection could a court have rescinded the contract, because at
every stage the Government could have argued persuasively that success
was imminent. Where," as in National Presto, losses are extreme and the
parties appear to have been jointly responsible for them, it is reasonable
to provide the flexible remedy of loss apportionment.
(4) Nature and extent of contribution to the defense effort,
including inventive and developmental contribution and cooperation
with the Government and other contractors in supplying technical
assistance;
(5) Character of business, including source and nature of ma-
terials, complexity of manufacturing technique, character and extent of
subcontracting, and rate of turn-over;
(6) Such other factors the consideration of which the public
interest and fair and equitable dealing may require, which factors shall
be published in the regulations of the Board from time to time as
adopted.
6865 Stat. 21-22 (1951), as amended, 28 U.S.C. Ap,. §1218 (1964).
5 9 Boeing Co. v. Renegotiation Board, 325 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1963); Golbert v.
Renegotiation Board, 254 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
6o The danger inherent in this condition may be remote in view of the apparently
lenient attitude of the Court of Claims. See cases cited note 42 supra.
81 See Note, Formal and Doctrinal Differences Between Government and Private
Contracts, 1 Sx DiEro L. REv. 88, 90, 96 (1964).
Since these clauses cannot be bargained out of the contract, there should be no
different treatment for large contractors. For discussion of the problem of contracts
in which the Government has forced the private contractor to assume the risk of loss,
see generally Cuneo & Crowell, Impossibility of Performance-Assumption of Risk
or Act of Submission?, 29 LAw & Co;TEmp. PRoB. 531 (1964) ; Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629
(1943).
02 See GA. CoDE Azmu. § 37-202 (1962).
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